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CompetenceIn four studies, we report evidence that admiration affects intergroup behaviors that regulate social hierarchy.
We demonstrate that manipulating the legitimacy of status relations affects admiration for the dominant and
that this emotion negatively predicts political action tendencies aimed at social change. In addition, we show
that greater warmth and competence lead to greater admiration for an outgroup, which in turn positively
predicts deferential behavior and intergroup learning. We also demonstrate that, for those with a disposition
to feel admiration, increasing admiration for an outgroup decreases willingness to take political action against
that outgroup. Finally,we show thatwhen the object of admiration is a subversive “martyr,” admiration positively
predicts political action tendencies and behavior aimed at challenging the status quo. These ﬁndings provide the
ﬁrst evidence for the important role of admiration in regulating social hierarchy.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Introduction
Imagine your personal hero. For many, this simple task may cause a
cascade of positive other-praising emotions such as admiration, respect,
awe, and reverence. Social psychologists and philosophers have
suggested that these emotions play a functional role in maintaining so-
cial hierarchy. Speciﬁcally, feeling admiration for the powerful and
dominant should inhibit challenges to the existing social order. The
present research offers the ﬁrst test of this hypothesis by examining
the antecedents and consequences of intergroup admiration, and the
role of dispositional admiration-proneness, in predicting hierarchy-
enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating intergroup behaviors. In addition
to its theorized system-maintaining role, we highlight how admiration
can also serve to attenuate intergroup hierarchy, depending on the
object of one's admiration.iff University, Tower Building,
an).
rights reserved.Admiration regulates social hierarchy
In addition to regulatingphysiology, perception, and cognition, emo-
tions serve important social functions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). For ex-
ample, recent work has begun to sketch the importance of positive
emotions in the regulation of interpersonal relationships (Shiota,
Campos, Keltner, & Hertenstein, 2004). This regulatory function of emo-
tion also applies at “higher” levels of analyses such as intergroup rela-
tions (Iyer & Leach, 2008; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Mackie, Silver, &
Smith, 2004). However, there is little work on the function of positive
emotions at this level (although, see Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008).
Among the positive emotions is a distinct set of other-praising emotions
that include admiration, awe, reverence, elevation and respect. These
emotions are all associated with appreciating or praising an “other”
(Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Ortony, Clore, & Collins,
1988). In short, we are likely to feel admiration towards those who
engage in praiseworthy actions (Ortony et al., 1988). Philosophers
(e.g., Burke, 1757/1990; Smith, 1759/2010) and psychologists
(e.g., Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Keltner & Haidt, 2003) have proposed
that admiration plays an important functional role in the maintenance
of social hierarchy. More speciﬁcally, admiration is thought to carry
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the emotion (Burke, 1757/1990; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Keltner &
Haidt, 2003; Smith, 1759/2010). In this sense, admiration can be seen
as maintaining social hierarchy.
A key point of departure between the present approach and previous
theorizing on admiration is that we suggest that admiration does not
only act to maintain the social order. Rather it can also, depending on
the object of admiration, serve as a means of engendering behavior that
challenges the social hierarchy or inhibits behavior that would maintain
it. Put simply, we suggest that admiration's role in regulating social
hierarchy depends on the object of the emotion (Iyer & Leach, 2008).
Antecedents, consequences, and dispositions
At the intergroup level, admiration is felt towards groups perceived
as being high in competence and warmth (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008).
Here warmth represents the extent to which groups have shared goals
(cooperation), and competence is said to stem from a group's position
in the social hierarchy (status). From this stereotype content model's
(SCM) perspective, admiration should be associated with helping and
cooperating with members of that group (Cuddy et al., 2008). Such a
tendency to help the powerful may contribute to the maintenance of
the social order. However, given that providing help to a group can in
itself serve as a means of creating dependence and reinforcing the
recipient's subordinate position (see Nadler, 2002), it seems that
intergroup helping is unlikely to be themost important behavior for en-
suring that social hierarchy is maintained. Instead, we propose that
there are other important behavioral consequences of admiration that
help to maintain the social order. Speciﬁcally, we propose that admira-
tion maintains social hierarchy by inhibiting political action aimed at
challenging the social order, and by engendering deferential behavior.
Our reasoning is in linewith approaches that suggest that emotion is
crucial to regulating intergroup behavior (e.g., Iyer & Leach, 2008;
Mackie et al., 2004). For example, research has shown that anger felt
by disadvantaged groups is among the most powerful predictors of po-
litical action aimed at changing the social order (Smith & Kessler, 2004;
Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). We suggest that a focus
on action-oriented emotions like anger may obscure an important
facet of the regulation of social hierarchy. Rather than social hierarchy
being maintained by a lack of anger over injustice (Wakslak, Jost,
Tyler, & Chen, 2007),we suggest that itsmaintenance can bemore emo-
tionally active. Speciﬁcally, admiration for the dominant, as well as a
lack of anger, is important for engendering behaviors that facilitate
the maintenance of social hierarchy and for inhibiting those that
would challenge the social order.
Although intergroup perspectives other than the SCMhave not dealt
directly with the antecedents and consequences of admiration, many of
these other perspectives would suggest that admiration should be elic-
ited by legitimate status and/or power (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The legitimate status of the
“other” (e.g., outgroup, third-party) should induce admiration. While
the idea that legitimacy inhibits political action to challenge the status
quo is not new (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the idea that this is (in part) be-
cause of admiration for those that have legitimate status has not previ-
ously been directly considered.
Finally, people vary in their tendencies to feel positive emotions, and
these dispositions have been found to play an important role in theway
people think, perceive, and act (Shiota, Keltner, & Mossman, 2007). In-
terestingly, dispositions for positive emotions are also related to the reg-
ulation of social hierarchy. For instance, research has shown that people
who are prone to experience pride aremore likely to have been promot-
ed in their jobs or given awards and less likely to have been ﬁred than
those who are not prone to experiencing pride (Shiota et al., 2004).
We suggest that those that are prone to experience admiration should
also, when appraising admiration-eliciting groups, be less likely to
take action aimed against that group's progress in the social hierarchy.The present research
We aim to demonstrate that admiration plays a crucial role in reg-
ulating social hierarchy, and that it does so via its impact on relevant
intergroup behaviors. More speciﬁcally, we suggest that appraising a
group as warm, competent, and having legitimate status should elicit
admiration towards that group. Moreover, feeling admiration to-
wards the dominant and powerful will inhibit political action aimed
at “progressive” social change. However, when the object of admira-
tion is a subversive hero or martyr, the emotion should engender ac-
tion to challenge the social order. Similarly, if the object of admiration
is an outgroup then admiration may inhibit action aimed at main-
taining dominance and engender deferential behavior towards that
group. Finally, we suggest that dispositions towards feeling admira-
tion should moderate the relationship between admiration and
hierarchy-enhancing intergroup behavior. This reasoning adds to cur-
rent perspectives on collective political action and social change by
placing positive emotions at the heart of social hierarchy and suggests
that the maintenance (and change) of the status quo relies on posi-
tive, as much as negative, emotions. Moreover, it focuses on the
way in which emotions inhibit, as opposed to facilitate, different po-
litical actions (see also Miller, Cronin, Garcia, & Branscombe, 2009).
We tested our ideas by manipulating admiration and its antecedents
and examining their inﬂuence on political action over income inequali-
ty (Study 1), deferential and other intergroup behavior (Study 2), polit-
ical action against an immigrant group (Study 3), and action for political
freedom (Study 4).
Study 1
In intergroup relations' terms, admiration can be conceptualized
as implying an appraisal of legitimate status and/or power. In this
study we manipulated the legitimacy of the actions of the object of
admiration. More speciﬁcally, we manipulated whether “prestigious
universities” legitimately (vs. illegitimately) enabled their students
to earn more on graduation than those students graduating from
“less prestigious universities”.
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 89 undergraduate students (sex and age were not
directly recorded, but the modal age was 19 years, and approximately
70% of participants were female) recruited from the participant panel
in the School of Psychology at Cardiff University. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of two conditions (legitimacy of object's actions:
legitimate vs. illegitimate).
Procedure
The experiment was presented as a survey of student attitudes to-
wards a research report examining levels of graduate income. Partici-
pants were told that the survey was comparing students at different
“classes” of university highlighted in the report. We used six outgroup
universities, three higher and three lower in status than the partici-
pants' institution (although the home institution was not explicitly
mentioned in the report). In order to enhance category salience, partic-
ipants rated students from each class of university on a series of traits
relating to the dimensions of warmth and competence. Participants
were then instructed to read the report's executive summary. This doc-
umented an inequality in graduate earnings between classes of institu-
tion, with graduates from prestigious universities earning more on
average than their counterparts from less prestigious universities,
even after accounting for relevant personal characteristics (e.g., gender,
class, age, educational attainment, and employer satisfaction).
In the illegitimate condition, participants read that the inequality
was explained by the fact that prestigious universities monopolized
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through their actions, “prestigious institutions are responsible for the
disadvantaged earnings position of graduates from less prestigious uni-
versities.” In the legitimate condition, the amount of business and polit-
ical capital was not described as limited. Rather, inequality was framed
as being due to the fact that prestigious universities choose to make
businesses/political links, while less prestigious institutions “do not
play an active role in establishing and maintaining business and politi-
cal links,” suggesting that the prestigious universities were not respon-
sible for the plight of disadvantaged students. Participants then went
on to complete the rest of the survey incorporating the dependent
measures.
Measures
Manipulation checks. We checked the legitimacy of the prestigious uni-
versities' actions using seven items derived from Gordijn, Yzerbyt,
Wigboldus, and Dumont (2006). Participants were asked to rate on a
scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) the extent to which they saw
the prestigious universities' actions as: “fair,” “harmless,” “normal,”
“rational,” “unjust”(reverse-coded), “prejudicial” (reverse-coded), and
“moral” (α=.85).
Admiration.Wemeasured admiration towards the prestigious universi-
ties by asking participants to what extent they felt: “admiration,”
“respect,” “reverence,” “awe,” and “inspiration” when thinking about
prestigious universities (α=.92). These items were derived from
Algoe and Haidt (2009).
Political action tendencies. Participants used a scale from 1 (very unwilling)
to 7 (very willing) to indicate the extent to which they would be willing
to perform several actions (α=.92) to support the grievances of grad-
uates from less prestigious universities. The political action items
were derived fromVan Zomeren et al. (2004): “send an email of protest
to the government/MP,” “participate in a demonstration,” “help orga-
nize a petition,” “participate in some form of collective action to stop
this situation,” “donate money to the cause,” “do something together
with others to stop this situation,” and “participate in raising our collec-
tive voice to stop this situation.”
Results and discussion
Manipulation checks
An ANOVA with the legitimacy manipulation as a between-
participants factor and legitimacy appraisals as the dependent variable
revealed a main effect of the manipulation on the perceived legitimacy
of the prestigious universities' actions, F(1, 89)=4.51, p=.036, ηp2=
.049. Those in the illegitimate condition perceived the prestigious uni-
versities' actions as more illegitimate (M=3.89, SD=.94) than those
in the legitimate condition (M=4.33, SD=1.03).
Path analysis
To test our predictions regarding the indirect effects of our legiti-
macy manipulation on political action tendencies, we speciﬁed the
path model illustrated in Fig. 1, which also shows the standardized
paths, R2, and “good” model ﬁt indices (see Schermelleh-Engel,
Moosbrugger, & Müller, 2003). The legitimacy manipulation had aLegitimacy Admirat.29*
R2
Fig. 1. Path-analytic model (Study 1): Inﬂuence of legitimacy and admiration on political action
GFI .999, AGFI .994, RMSEA .001.signiﬁcant direct effect on admiration. When prestigious universities'
actions were legitimate, participants felt greater levels of admiration
for those universities (M=3.96, SD=1.18) than when the actions
were illegitimate (M=3.23, SD=1.25). Of importance, there was a
signiﬁcant negative path from admiration to political action. Admira-
tion for the dominant and powerful inhibited political action aimed
at social change. Surprisingly, there was no main effect of legitimacy
on political action tendencies (β=− .04, p=.711). However, we
proceeded to test the indirect effects of legitimacy on action tenden-
cies because exogenous variables can exert an inﬂuence on the ﬁnal
endogenous variable(s) in a model in the absence of an association
(main effect) between them (see Hayes, 2009; Shrout & Bolger,
2002; Zhoa, Lynch, & Chen, 2010).
Analysis of indirect effects. To test the indirect effects of the legitimacy
manipulation we carried out bootstrapping procedures (see Shrout &
Bolger, 2002). This involved generating 5000 random bootstrap sam-
ples with replacement from the data set (N=89) and testing the
modelwith these samples. Thismethod does not dependupon a normal
sampling distribution (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002).
The analysis revealed a signiﬁcant indirect effect of legitimacy, with
a point estimate of − .075 and a 95% BC (bias-corrected; see Efron,
1987) bootstrap conﬁdence interval of − .169 to − .015. These results
are consistent with our predicted causal model. When inequality is
explained through legitimate (vs. illegitimate) actions of the dominant
party, individuals feel more admiration for the dominant party and are
therefore less likely to take action aimed at reducing inequality. This
ﬁnding supports the notion that admiration is an emotion elicited by
legitimate status.
Study 2
The results of Study 1 are consistent with the idea that legitimate
status elicits admiration that helps to maintain the status quo by
inhibiting political action aimed at challenging the social order. We
wanted to build on these ﬁndings in two ways. First, as mentioned
above, there are alternative proposals concerning admiration's anteced-
ents and consequences. Cuddy et al. (2008) suggested that admiration
is elicited by groups that are seen as high in both warmth and compe-
tence, and that this emotion leads to active facilitation (i.e., helping).
Therefore, wewanted to examine these two other antecedents. Second,
if admiration regulates social hierarchy, it is important to show not only
that it inhibits challenges to the social order (i.e., political action) and
engenders intergroup helping of the powerful (Cuddy et al., 2008),
but also that it engenders deference to the object of the admiration
(Burke, 1757/1990; Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Smith, 1759/2010). This
view is in line with the idea that admiration functions as ameans of ori-
entating individuals towards expert models for cultural/social learning,
and that this dependency results in those with valued skills obtaining
prestige or freely-conferred deference (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001).
Third, if our analysis is to add to current perspectives on the regulatory
role of emotion in intergroup relations it is important to show that the
inﬂuence of admiration is unique. Therefore, in the present studywe ex-
amined the effects of competence and warmth on key SCM emotions
(admiration, contempt, and pity) and behavioral tendencies (deference,
cultural learning, and helping).ion
= .09
-.26* Political action
R2= .07
tendencies with path weights (*pb .05) and R2. Model ﬁt: χ2=.133, df=1, χ2/df=.133,
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Participants and design
Participants were 123 undergraduate students (17 men and 106
women; age:M=19.44, SD=1.37) recruited from a university partici-
pant panel. They were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a
2 (competence: high vs. low)×2 (warmth: high vs. low) between-
groups factorial design.
Materials and procedure
Following Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick (2007), participants read about
a ﬁctitious ethnic group expected to immigrate to the UK in the
near future. Participants were either informed that, “Members of
this group are viewed by their society as competent (or incompetent)
and intelligent (or unintelligent), and as warm (or not warm) and
good-natured (or not good-natured).” Participants then went on to
complete the rest of the study.
Measures
Manipulation checks. We checked the perceived warmth and compe-
tence of the group by asking participants about the extent to which
the immigrant group was thought of as “warm” and “good-natured”
(r=.88), and “competent” and “intelligent” (r=.92).
Emotions. Participants were asked how likely they were to feel
“contempt,” “pity,” and “admiration” towards the new immigrant
group. Participants responded on a 7-point scale ranging from 1
(extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely).
Action tendencies.Weasked participants to indicate the extent towhich
they would behave in each of the following ways towards the new im-
migrant group: “defer to” (deference), “learn from” (cultural learning),
and “help” (active facilitation). Participants responded on a 7-point
scale ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely).
Results and discussion
Manipulation checks
We ran an ANOVA with warmth (high vs. low) and competence
(high vs. low) as factors and the warmth rating as our dependent
measure. Those in the high warmth condition (M=5.49, SD=.99)
rated the immigrant group as more warm than did those in the low
warmth condition (M=2.90, SD=1.35), F(1, 120)=145.08, pb .001,
ηp2=.55. There was no main effect of competence, F(1, 120)=0.29,
p=.59, and the interaction was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 120)=0.22,
p=.64. Nextwe ran a similar ANOVAwith competence as our dependent
measure. Those in the high competence condition (M=5.41, SD=1.03)
rated the immigrant group as more competent than did those in the
low competence condition (M=3.00, SD=1.39), F(1, 120)=120.21,
pb .001, ηp2=.50. There was no main effect of warmth, F(1, 120)=0.01,
p=.93, and the interaction was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 120)=0.47, p=.49.
Path analysis
Full path model. In order to test our predictions regarding the effects
of competence and warmth we speciﬁed the path model shown in
Fig. 2. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between
all continuous variables in the model are reported in Table 1. The
standardized path weights, R2, and good model ﬁt indices are
shown in Fig. 2. As predicted, there were signiﬁcant positive direct ef-
fects of competence and warmth on admiration, and a signiﬁcant neg-
ative direct effect of competence on pity. When the immigrant group
was said to be high in competence, participants felt greater admira-
tion for them. Participants also felt greater admiration when the im-
migrants were described as high in warmth. We used effect codingto compute the warmth and competence interaction term. This had
no signiﬁcant direct effects on any of the endogenous variables.
Greater pity was felt when the immigrant group was described as in-
competent, although there was no direct effect of warmth on pity. In
addition, there were no direct effects of warmth or competence on
contempt. The lack of an effect of warmth on pity and contempt is in-
consistent with Cuddy et al.'s correlational data. Given that the au-
thors provided no causal test of the antecedents of intergroup
emotions, it may be the case that feelings of pity and contempt affect
the perceived warmth of a group.
Consistent with Cuddy et al. (2007) therewere signiﬁcant (positive)
direct paths from admiration and pity to helping (active facilitation). In
addition, there was a signiﬁcant negative path from contempt to
helping. In terms of our other action tendencies, there was a signiﬁcant
(positive) direct path from admiration to deference. The direct paths
from the other emotions to deference were not signiﬁcant. There was
also a signiﬁcant (positive) path from admiration to cultural learning,
and a signiﬁcant (negative) link between contempt and cultural learn-
ing. As predicted, feeling greater admiration (as well as less contempt)
for a group was associated with greater likelihood of social learning
from that group and (in the case of admiration) with greater levels of
deference. This is an initial evidence to support the idea that admiration
orientates one towards good models for cultural learning (Henrich &
Gil-White, 2001). The idea that learning leads to deference is also
supported, in that learning from the immigrant groupwas positively as-
sociated with deference (see Table 1). However, this association did not
remain signiﬁcant in the full model where helping the immigrant group
is also included. The ﬁndings of this study offer further support for the
notion that admiration plays a vital role in regulating social hierarchy,
not only by inhibiting challenging behavior (Study 1), but also by
encouraging deference to the object of admiration.
Analysis of indirect effects
As before, we carried out bootstrapping procedures to test the pre-
dicted indirect effects. First, we tested the indirect effects of our manip-
ulated variables on our outcome variables via the pity pathway. This test
revealed that the indirect effect of competence on helping was signiﬁ-
cant, with a point estimate of− .040 and 95% BC CI of− .104 to− .005.
When the immigrant groupwas described as low in competence, partic-
ipants felt a greater sense of pity,whichwas associatedwith greater like-
lihood of helping the group. There were no other signiﬁcant indirect
effects throughpity. In addition, therewere no signiﬁcant indirect effects
of our manipulated variables through contempt.
Finally, we tested the indirect effects of our manipulated variables
through admiration. This test revealed that the indirect effect of compe-
tence on helping was signiﬁcant, with a point estimate of .139 and 95%
BC CI of .072 to .226. There was also an indirect effect of warmth on
helping, with a point estimate of .071 and 95% BC CI of .011 to .153.
When the immigrant group was described as high in competence or
warmth, participants reported greater admiration, which was linked
to increased likelihood of helping the group. This is in line with Cuddy
et al.'s ﬁnding that admiration mediates the positive effects of compe-
tence and warmth on helping. Analysis revealed an indirect effect of
warmth on deference, with a point estimate of .068 and 95% BC CI of
.014 to .142. There was also an indirect effect of competence on defer-
ence, with a point estimate of .132 and 95% BC CI of .063 to .231. Here,
as the immigrant group's competence or warmth increased, partici-
pants' feelings of admiration towards them increased and, in turn, par-
ticipants were more likely to defer to the group. These results build on
the SCM ﬁndings (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2007), suggesting that while com-
petence stems from a group's status, it also elicits admiration that, in
turn, engenders deference to the group, thereby potentially acting as a
means of maintaining status. Admiration not only elicits helping but
also simultaneously engenders deference.
Further tests revealed that the indirect effect of competence on
cultural learning through admiration was signiﬁcant, with a point
Defer to
Help.18*
Competence Admiration.33***
.60**
*
Contempt
.20*
R2 = .02
-.20* Learn from
R2 = .44
WarmXCom Pity
Warmth
R2 = .14
R2 = .25R2 = .03
R2 = .15
-.17*
.37***
-.20*
.39***
Fig. 2. Path-analytic model (Study 2): Inﬂuence of competence and warmth on deference, cultural learning, and helping with path weights (*pb .05, **pb .01, ***pb .001) and R2.
Nonsigniﬁcant paths are shown as grayed-out broken arrows. Different emotions and action tendencies were allowed to covary with each other. Model ﬁt: χ2=7.864, df=12,
χ2/df=.655, GFI .986, AGFI .948, RMSEA .001.
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rect effect of warmth on cultural learning through admiration, with a
point estimate of .110 and 95% BC CI of .015 to .222. This supports the
idea that the admiration elicited through competence and warmth in
turn helps to orientate people towards good models for the cultural
learning of skills and competences (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Al-
though Henrich and Gil-White (2001) did not explicitly mention
warmth as an attribute of their model, given that cooperation is need-
ed for cultural learning it makes sense (all else being equal) that
warmer models would be preferred to colder ones.
Study 3
The results of Studies 1 and 2 shed some light on the antecedents
and consequences of intergroup admiration. We wanted to build on
these ﬁndings in three ways. First, we wanted to provide a more direct
test of the causal role of admiration on intergroup behavior. Second, we
wanted to examinewhether dispositional tendencies to feel admiration
inﬂuence intergroup behaviors. Third, wewanted to testwhether admi-
ration can under some conditions inhibit rather than bolster intergroup
behaviors that maintain the social hierarchy. Therefore, in the present
study we sought to manipulate admiration and to examine the role of
individual differences in admiration-proneness on tendencies to take
political action against an immigrant group. We reasoned that admira-
tion towards the immigrant group should inhibit political action against
it and that this should be particularly true for those that are prone to
feeling admiration.Table 1
Bivariate correlations, means and standard deviations for all measures (Study 2).
1 2 3 4 5
1. Contempt (M=3.12, SD=1.57)
2. Pity (M=3.41, SD=1.53) − .17†
3. Admiration (M=3.22, SD=1.42) − .14 .13
4. Defer to (M=2.69, SD=1.29) .04 − .03 .34⁎⁎⁎
5. Learn from (M=3.73, SD=1.49) − .29⁎⁎ − .10 .63⁎⁎⁎ .23⁎⁎
6. Help (M=4.40, SD=1.48) − .23⁎ .19⁎ .44⁎⁎⁎ .18⁎ .57⁎⁎⁎
† pb .10.
⁎ pb .05.
⁎⁎ pb .01.
⁎⁎⁎ pb .001.Method
Participants and design
Participantswere 58 undergraduate students (3men and 55women;
age:M=19.55, SD=1.10) recruited from a university participant panel.
They were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: admiration vs.
control.
Materials and procedure
As in Study 2, participants read about a ﬁctitious ethnic group
expected to immigrate to the UK in the near future. Following Cuddy
et al. (2007), participants were either informed that, “Members of this
group are generally admired by others in their society,” or that, “Others
in their society generally have no strong feelings towards members of
this group.” Participants thenwent on to complete the rest of the study.
Measures
Dispositional admiration-proneness.We adapted the dispositional pos-
itive emotion scale (Shiota, Keltner, & John, 2006) to form a 12-item
(α=.92) measure of admiration-proneness. The items were, “I
often feel admiration,” “I see excellence all aroundme,” “I feel wonder
for others achievements almost every day,” “When I see someone
performing well, I feel a powerful urge to admire them,” “I have
many opportunities to witness skilled and talented people,” “I seek
out people that have exceptional ability,” “I admire many people,” “I
ﬁnd it easy to admire others,” “I often notice the amazing things
that other people have done,” “The degree of human ability often
amazes me,” “I often feel bursts of admiration,” and “On a typical
day, others inspire admiration in me.” Participants were asked to
rate how true each of the statements were of themselves on a
7-point scale ranging from 1 (not true) to 7 (very true).
Manipulation check. We checked admiration towards the group by
asking participants about the extent to which the immigrant group
was “admired” and “respected” (r=.82).
Political action tendencies. Using the same items (α=.96) as Study 1,
we asked participants to indicate how willing people would be to en-
gage in political action in order to stop the new immigrant group
coming to the UK.
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Fig. 3. Political action tendencies as a function of admiration and disposition (Study 3).
Based on estimated means with high (+1SD) and low (−1SD) admiration-proneness.
1 The Tiananmen protest/massacre is referred to as the June 4th “incident” in China.
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We ran an ANOVA with the manipulation check as the DV and the
admiration manipulation as the factor and admiration-proneness
(mean-centered) entered as a covariate, along with the 2-way interac-
tion term between them. Those in the admiration condition (M=3.54,
SD=1.51) did not differ signiﬁcantly in their ratings of admiration to-
wards the outgroup from the control condition (M=3.08, SD=1.18),
F(1, 54)=1.63, p=.207. In addition, therewas a nomain effect of admi-
ration tendencies, F(1, 54)=0.15, p=.696. These ﬁndings were quali-
ﬁed by a near-signiﬁcant 2-way interaction, F(1, 54)=3.22, p=.078,
ηp2=.06. To interpret the interaction, we performed simple effects anal-
yses of the admiration manipulation at low (−1 SD) and high (+1 SD)
levels of admiration-proneness. Results revealed that when participants
were low in admiration-proneness, those in the admiration condition
(M=3.28, SD=1.86) did not differ in their admiration reports from
those in the control condition (M=3.47, SD=1.92), F(1, 54)=0.13,
p=.715. In contrast, when participants were high in admiration-
proneness, those in the admiration condition (M=3.78, SD=1.81)
reported signiﬁcantly greater levels of admiration towards the immi-
grant group than those in the control condition (M=2.69, SD=1.94),
F(1, 54)=4.76, p=.03, ηp2=.08.
Next we ran the ANOVA with political action tendencies as the DV.
Results revealed a weak, non-signiﬁcant, trend with those in the ad-
miration condition (M=3.37, SD=1.52) rating people as less willing
to take political action against the immigrant group than did those in
the control condition (M=3.91, SD=1.45), F(1, 54)=2.70, p=.107,
ηp2=.05. There was a main effect of admiration tendencies, F(1, 54)=
5.26, p=.026, ηp2=.09, such that admiration-proneness was positively
associated with greater perceived political action tendencies to stop the
immigrant group. This ﬁnding was unpredicted, but we speculate that
in the same way that pride-proneness reﬂects higher status (Shiota et
al., 2004) general admiration-proneness may reﬂect relatively low
status and respect for authority. As such, onemight expect this emotion
disposition to be associated with authoritarian or system-maintaining
attitudes. Importantly, these ﬁndings were qualiﬁed by a near-
signiﬁcant 2-way interaction, F(1, 54)=3.54, p=.065, ηp2=.06. To
interpret the interaction,we performed simple effects analyses of the ad-
miration manipulation at low and high levels of admiration-proneness.
As can be seen in Fig. 3, when participants were low (−1 SD) in
admiration-proneness, those in the admiration condition (M=3.30,
SD=1.90) did not differ from those in the control condition (M=3.21,
SD=1.82) in terms of political action tendencies against the immigrant
group, F(1, 54)=0.03, p=.856. In contrast, when participantswere high
(+1 SD) in admiration-proneness, those in the admiration condition
(M=3.45, SD=1.98) had signiﬁcantly lower political action tendencies
against the immigrant group than those in the control condition (M=
4.76, SD=2.16), F(1, 54)=5.78, p=.02, ηp2=.10. As predicted, when
presented with a group that was admired (vs. not), those who were
prone to feeling admiration rate their group as being less likely to take
political action against the outgroup. The notion that admiration-
proneness leads to heightened tendencies to distinguish emotion-
relevant (i.e., admiration) information about others is in line with the
appraisal tendency approach to emotion (Lerner & Keltner, 2000).
Although the effect of ourmanipulation is not straight forward, our ﬁnd-
ings are consistent and point towards the importance of positive emo-
tion dispositions in the regulation of intergroup relations.
Study 4
The results of the previous studies yield evidence that admiration
towards competent, warm, and high-status groups can inhibit political
action aimed at progressive social change, and engender deference. In
addition, admiration towards a group can also inhibit political action
tendencies aimed against that group. Despite the theoretical emphasis
on the social hierarchy maintaining function of admiration, it seemsthat there is nothing inherently hierarchy-maintaining about admira-
tion, at least at the group level. Rather, we argue that it is the object of
emotion (see Iyer & Leach, 2008) that determines the social function
of admiration. In linewith this, we reason that when the object of admi-
ration is a subversive “hero” or “martyr,” admiration should actively
engender political action aimed at challenging the social hierarchy. As
with much work on collective political action (for a review, see Van
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), our previous studies did not em-
ploy behavioralmeasures of political action and employed student sam-
ples encountering novel or incidental intergroup situations. What
remains to be tested is whether admiration plays a role in historically
signiﬁcant political issues. Therefore, in the present study we aimed to
test the impact of admiration towards ﬁgures that challenge the status
quo (and the authorities) on both political action tendencies and behav-
ior. To do this we examined the emotions of Hong Kong residents in
relation to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, their willingness to
engage in protest, and their decision to sign a petition calling for the
Chinese government to change its position on the issue.Method
Participants and design
Participants in this correlational study were 390 adult Hong Kong
residents (154 men and 236 women; age:M=29.03, SD=9.53) who
were recruited via advertisements on Facebook. Participants were
entered into a prize draw for Amazon vouchers.Procedure
Participants were invited to take part in an online survey of Hong
Kong residents' attitudes and feelings regarding the “June 4th incident”1
(Tiananmen Square massacre). Participants initially ﬁlled in demo-
graphic questions and checks to ensure they were Hong Kong residents.
They then read details of the suppression of the Tiananmen Square pro-
testors and the resulting substantial loss of life. Participants then read
that the Chinese government has not apologized for the killings, refuses
to carry out a public inquiry, and interferes with the public mourning of
those killed on June 4th. They then went on to complete the key depen-
dent measures, along with several ﬁller items. At the end of the survey
participants were informed that they had the chance to participate in
an online petition calling on the Chinese government to reverse their
position on the June 4th event (i.e., full public investigation and apology,
compensation to those affected, and the right of familymembers to pub-
licly mourn those killed). After this participants were fully debriefed.
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Anger. Participants were asked how strongly they felt “angry,” “irritated,”
and “furious” in relation to “June 4th incident” (α=.84). For all emotion
measures, participants responded on a 7-point scale ranging from 1
(not at all) to 7 (extremely).
Sympathy. Participants were asked the extent to which they felt
“empathic,” “sympathetic,” and “compassionate” (α=.88) when
thinking about those affected by the June 4th incident.
Admiration. We measured admiration by asking participants to what
extent they felt “admiration,” “respect,” and “inspired”when thinking
about the Chinese government (α=.77), and the victims of the June
4th incident (a=.89).
Political action. Participants used a scale from 1 (very unwilling) to 7
(very willing) to indicate their willingness to do each of ﬁve things in
order to support a campaign to reverse the Chinese government stance
on June 4th: “sign a petition addressed to the Chinese government,”
“join the annual June 4th protest,” “join the annual June 4th candlelight
vigil,” “help organize a petition,” and “donate money to the cause”
(α=.95). Protest behavior was measured by recording whether or
not participants chose to add their name to the online petition.
Results and discussion
Structural equation modeling (SEM)
The sample size of the present study allowed us to conduct structur-
al equationmodeling (usingAmos 6.0) using latent variables, which has
advantages over path analyses using only manifest variables (Kline,
2005). To test our predictions regarding the effects of admiration
(both towards the government and towards the 4th June victims) we
speciﬁed the model in Fig. 4. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate
correlations between all continuousmanifest variables in themodel are
reported in Table 2. The standardized paths, R2, and adequate model ﬁt
statistics are shown in Fig. 4. All manifest measures loaded signiﬁcantly
on to their respective latent variable (ranging between .40 and .96).
Analysis revealed that, as expected, therewas a signiﬁcant (positive) di-
rect path from anger to political action tendencies, and a signiﬁcant
(negative) direct path from admiration for the Chinese government to
political action tendencies. In addition, therewas a signiﬁcant (positive)
direct path from admiration for the victims of June 4th to political action
tendencies. Feeling admiration towards the victims of the Tiananmen
Square massacre was signiﬁcantly associated with willingness to take
political action aimed at tackling the government's position on the
issue, in the presence of anger, sympathy, and admiration for the
authorities.
These ﬁndings demonstrate the distinct role of admiration in regu-
lating intergroup behavior. Both admiration towards the government
and towards the protesters uniquely predicted political action tenden-
cies in the presence of anger and sympathy. In contrast, sympathy
was not a signiﬁcant predictor of political action tendencies. This is
consistent with Thomas et al.'s (2009) argument that sympathy is
not an optimal emotion for engendering political action. Finally, and
as expected, there was a signiﬁcant (positive) direct path from political
action tendencies to signing the petition. The stronger the action ten-
dencies, the more likely participants were to add their name to the
petition.
Analysis of indirect effects. As before, we carried out bootstrapping pro-
cedures to test the predicted indirect effects on our behavioral measure
(signing a petition). These revealed that the indirect effect of anger via
action tendencies was positive and signiﬁcant, with a point estimate of
.227 and 95% BC CI of .147 to .316. The indirect effect of admiration for
the government via action tendencies was negative and signiﬁcant,with a point estimate of − .099 and 95% BC CI of − .155 to − .046.
There was also a positive indirect effect of admiration for the victims
of June 4th, via action tendencies, with a point estimate of .196 and
95% BC CI of .111 to .305. The indirect effect of sympathy was not
signiﬁcant.
General discussion
We set out to examine the antecedents of intergroup admiration,
and to test its role in regulating intergroup behaviors that maintain or
challenge the social hierarchy. Across four studies, employing a mix of
correlational and experimental designs, we found evidence consistent
with the idea that admiration regulates social hierarchy. Speciﬁcally,
legitimate high status engenders admiration that is associated with
inhibiting political action aimed at challenging the status quo. In addi-
tion, high competence and/or warmth elicit admiration that is associat-
ed with deferential behavior. However, we show that admiration does
not always have a system-maintaining effect. Rather, admiration to-
wards an outgroup can lead to the inhibition of political action against
that group. In addition, admiration can engender political action that
challenges the prevailing social order, when the object of admiration
is a subversive hero or martyr. Taken together, our ﬁndings suggest
that positive emotions such as admiration play an important role in reg-
ulating social hierarchy through their inﬂuence on intergroup behavior
(Iyer & Leach, 2008; Mackie et al., 2004).
It is important to distinguish the present approach from other work
on affect, emotion, social hierarchy, and political action. For instance,
work has shown that maintaining or justifying the system itself may
serve a palliative function (Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Wakslak et al.,
2007). Here we are not concerned with how justifying the social order
may lead to less negative (or more positive) affect. Rather, we are
concerned with how speciﬁc emotions (DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, &
Rucker, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2000) involve the tendency to take
intergroup actions that regulate the social hierarchy (Mackie et al.,
2004). Whereas previous work on collective political action has tended
to focus on legitimacy as an antecedent of anger among the disadvan-
taged (Smith & Kessler, 2004; Van Zomeren et al., 2004), our ﬁndings
suggest that legitimatization also helps to maintain the social hierarchy
not just by decreasing negative emotions like anger (Wakslak et al.,
2007), but by engendering positive emotions such as admiration. On
the one hand, our results afﬁrm that legitimacy is a core appraisal in
the regulation of social hierarchy (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). On the other hand, our data suggest
that themaintenance of social hierarchymay not depend solely on legit-
imacy. Rather, competence may be enough to elicit admiration that, in
turn, is associated with deferential behavior. It may be the case that en-
gendering admiration through competence and excellence in valued
domains, as opposed to relying on legitimization, is an efﬁcient way
for those in a dominant position to maintain their advantage. This use
of admiration may represent an indirect or seemingly benign way to
maintain social hierarchy (Jackman, 1994). That said, if Henrich and
Gil-White (2001) are correct in their contention that admiration leads
to freely-conferred dominance, then it may be the case that admiration
based on competence serves to legitimize social hierarchy. In other
words, legitimacy may be both an antecedent and consequence of ad-
miration. This notion is in linewith the idea that emotion leads to a ten-
dency to perceive situations in ways that are consistent with the
antecedent cognitive-appraisals of the emotion (Lerner & Keltner,
2000). Future work would do well to examine the nature of this rela-
tionship between admiration and legitimacy.
Throughout our studies we chose to focus speciﬁcally on admiration
because it is the most prototypical other-praising emotion (Ortony et
al., 1988). However, we employed a range of other-praising emotion
words to measure this emotion. Although this is conceptually and sta-
tistically justiﬁable, we do not believe that all other-praising emotions
will be elicited by the same antecedents and have the same kinds of
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Fig. 4. Structural equation model (Study 4): Inﬂuence of anger, sympathy, and admiration (towards government and victims) on political action tendencies and signing a petition
with path weights (†pb .10, *pb .05, **pb .01, ***pb .001) and R2. Nonsigniﬁcant paths are shown as broken arrows. To simplify, manifest variables and the paths from latent to
manifest variables are not shown. Model ﬁt: χ2=345.3, df=125, χ2/df=2.762, GFI .911, AGFI .878, RMSEA .067.
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mate status engender admiration, it is less clear what engenders the
kind of admiration (towardsmartyrs) that leads to challenges to the so-
cial order. After all, the student activists in Tiananmenwere not success-
ful in their demands for democracy. Here it seems that warmth and
morality (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007) may be antecedents of this
type of admiration. While emotion theorists have suggested that admi-
ration has amoral component (Haidt, 2003; Haidt & Algoe, 2004), some
of the same theorists havemore recently suggested that elevation is the
other-praising emotion that one feels in response to moral excellence,
with admiration reﬂecting appraisals of competence (Algoe & Haidt,
2009). Future work needs to examine the moral component of other-
praising emotions and the way in which they impact on intergroup
behaviors that regulate social hierarchy. In addition, future work
needs to examine the relationship between admiration for high-status
outgroups and tendencies to embrace individual mobility strategies
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and meritocratic ideologies (Jost, Pelham,
Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
Finally, ourﬁndings suggest that dispositions to feel admirationmay
be important in determining the kind of intergroup behaviors that reg-
ulate social hierarchy. Indeed, dispositional tendencies to feel positive
emotions are differentially linked with peer- and self-rated openness
to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, andTable 2
Bivariate correlations, means and standard deviations for all continuous measures
(Study 4).
1 2 3 4
1. Anger (M=4.83, SD=1.52)
2. Sympathy (M=4.20, SD=.97) .53⁎⁎⁎
3. Admiration government
(M=2.78, SD=1.50)
− .45⁎⁎⁎ − .23⁎⁎⁎
4. Admiration victims
(M=5.61, SD=1.53)
.68⁎⁎⁎ .58⁎⁎⁎ − .47⁎⁎⁎
5. Political action
(M=4.67, SD=1.84)
.70⁎⁎⁎ .51⁎⁎⁎ − .55⁎⁎⁎ .77⁎⁎⁎
⁎⁎⁎ pb .001.neuroticism (Shiota et al., 2006). In the same way, dispositions to feel
particular emotionsmay also be associatedwith important (intergroup)
ideological attitudes such as social dominance orientation and right
wing authoritarianism (see Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum,
2002). Futureworkwould dowell to examine the relationship between
personality, emotional dispositions, and ideological attitudes.
As Adam Smith noted over 250 years ago, we may feel admiration
for those in the higher echelons of society, and the effect of this emotion
on one's behavior will serve to maintain the social order. However, the
present ﬁndings suggest that Smith and others were only partly correct
in their take on admiration. Admiration for those that choose to chal-
lenge the social order may engender insubordination instead of defer-
ence. The work reported here goes some way to explaining why and
how admiration accomplishes this.References
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